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Abstract
The struggle to stop Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam, whose reservoir was filled in December 2015, has lessons for 
other resource struggles in Amazonia and beyond. Among the impediments that failed to halt the dam were 
the resistance efforts of both indigenous and non-indigenous victims of the dam’s impacts, as well as the non-
governmental organizations and other actors supporting their cause. The pro-dam side had massive political 
and financial support from the top levels of the Brazilian government, including vigorous involvement of the 
country’s president. At the same time, achievements of the anti-dam side, particularly the local grassroots 
organizations, have provided inspiration for resource struggles elsewhere (although the victories of the resis-
tance are significantly less definitive than was thought by many at the time).
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ZusammenfassungDie Auseinandersetzungen um einen Stopp des Belo Monte Staudamms in Brasilien, dessen Stausee im Dezem-
ber 2015 geflutet wurde, beinhalten Lehren für andere Ressourcenkonflikte in Amazonien und darüber hinaus. 
Zu den Kräften, denen es letztendlich nicht gelungen war, den Staudammbau aufzuhalten, gehörten vor allem 
die Widerstandbemühungen der indigenen und nicht-indigenen direkt vom Staudammbau Betroffenen, die von 
Nicht-Regierungsorganisationen und anderen Akteuren in ihrer Sache unterstützt worden waren. Die Befür-
worter des Staudammbaus konnten ihrerseits auf die massive politische und finanzielle Unterstützung höchs-
ter Kreise der brasilianischen Regierung zählen, inklusive der energischen Einmischung der Präsidentin des 
Landes. Allerdings wirkten die Errungenschaften der Staudammgegner, insbesondere der lokalen Basisbewe-
gungen, durchaus inspirierend für andernorts stattfindende Ressourcenkonflikte (auch wenn die Erfolge des 
Widerstandes deutlich weniger klar ausfallen als zunächst von Vielen gedacht).
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  impacts
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1. Introduction
Brazil’s 11,233-MW Belo Monte Dam (Fig. 1) now 
blocks the Xingu River, displacing approximately 
25,000 people in the city of Altamira and 18,000 tra-
ditional riverside dwellers (ribeirinhos) along the 
stretch of this Amazon tributary that is flooded by the 
reservoir (Villas-Bôas et al. 2015: 12-13). When all of 
the turbines are installed in 2019 a 100-km stretch 
of river below the main dam will lose 80% of its wa-
ter flow, destroying the livelihoods of the ribeirinho 
population that depends on fishing in this area as well 
as indigenous people in two “indigenous lands” in this 
“reduced-flow” stretch and one on the Bacajá River, a 
tributary of the Xingu. Officially denied plans for ad-
ditional dams upstream of Belo Monte would flood 
vast areas of indigenous land. Environmental impacts 
will also be great. Logical, legal and ethical arguments 
were cast aside as the Belo Monte construction pro-
ject advanced (Fearnside 2017). 
Local actors and a wide range of outside support 
groups struggled against the Belo Monte plans but 
were unable to convince the Brazilian government to 
change course. Amazonia and other developing areas 
face many resource struggles, of which hydroelectric 
dams represent one important example. Such strug-
gles are likely to become even more common with 
continued expansion of society’s appetite for resources 
and of its capacity to extract them. Learning lessons 
from the Belo Monte struggle is therefore relevant to 
a wide variety of development issues. The present pa-
per examines the Belo Monte struggle and its lessons.
Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam: Lessons of an Amazonian resource struggle
#*
#*
50°W
50°W
55°W
55°W
5°
S
5°
S
10
°S
10
°S
0 150 30075
km
Belo Monte Dam
Babaquara (Altamira) Dam
#*Ipixuna Dam
#*Kakraimoro Dam
#*Iriri Dam
#*Jarina Dam
´
Indigenous land
Fig. 1
Dams and outlines of reservoirs originally 
planned for the Xingu River basin. Indig-
enous areas are crosshatched. The ques-
tion of whether dams upstream of Belo 
Monte will later be built, which Brazilian 
government authorities currently deny, is 
a critical part of the debate. Source: Own 
elaboration
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2. A brief history of the Belo Monte struggle
Planning for a series of dams on the Xingu River be-
gan in 1975 during Brazil’s 1964-1985 military dicta-
torship. In 1975 this author was living in one of the 
Transamazon Highway colonization areas 50 km from 
Altamira (Fearnside 1986). In a visit to the Altamira 
office of the National Institute for Colonization and 
Agrarian Reform (INCRA) I was given a map showing 
the areas to be flooded by the Babaquara (later re-
named “Altamira”) Dam, the first planned upstream 
of Belo Monte. That some of the colonization area 
would be flooded provoked understandable dismay 
among colonists in the agrovila (planned agricultural 
village) where I lived, but during the dictatorship any 
sort of objection or protest was out of the question.
An inventory of the Xingu River Basin proposed six 
large dams (Fig. 2), including “Kararaô” (now Belo 
Monte) (e.g. Sevá Filho 1990). Viability studies were 
prepared (CNEC 1980), and environmental studies 
(Brazil, ELETRONORTE nd [2002]) were done by the 
National Consortium of Consulting Engineers (Con-
sórcio Nacional de Engenheiros Consultores = CNEC), 
a consulting firm in São Paulo that, during the course 
of the study, was bought by Camargo Corrêa, the main 
construction firm preparing to build the dams.
Field studies on environmental impacts began in 1985, 
for which the CNEC consulting firm that had done the 
viability study was contracted (Saracura 2015). Aca-
demics from various universities and research insti-
tutions were hired as consultants to collect data for 
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Fig. 2 
Locations mentioned in the text.
Dams: 
1.) Belo Monte 
2.) Balbina 
3.) Tucuruí 
4.) Jirau 
5.) Santo Antônio
6.) Cachoeira Riberão
     (Guajará-Mirim)
7.) Babaquara (Altamira) 
8.) Chacorão 
9.) São Luiz do Tapajós 
10.) Jatobá  
Source: Fearnside 2017: 15
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use by CNEC in drafting the report. The consultants 
signed contracts committing themselves to secrecy, 
which has been a serious limitation since the begin-
ning of such reports (see Fearnside 2001; Pinto 2002: 
56). Problems also included pressuring researchers 
regarding the content of their submissions (Assis and 
Forline 2004).
In 1987 Brazilian Electrical Centers (Centrais Elé-
tricas Brasileiras = ELETROBRÁS), a Brazilian gov-
ernment holding company, produced the “2010 Plan” 
listing dams expected to be built by the year 2010 
as well as other dams without a limit on the date of 
planned construction (Brazil, ELETROBRÁS 1987). 
The report was released only after it had leaked to the 
public. The complete list indicates 79 large dams in 
Brazil’s Legal Amazonia region, with a total area of 10 
million hectares (see Fearnside 1995). Kararaô (Belo 
Monte) was indicated for construction by 2000 and 
Babaquara (Altamira) by 2005 (Brazil, ELETROBRÁS 
1987: 153–154). Brazil’s finances have not permitted 
dam construction at anything like the rate expected 
in the 2010 Plan. The 2010 Plan sparked a storm of 
criticism, and the Brazilian government never again 
released its complete plans for Amazonian dams inde-
pendent of the expected year of construction, releas-
ing instead only “ten-year plans” (planos decenais) for 
the dams to be built in the subsequent 10 years, and 
occasional medium term plans such as the 2015, 2020 
and 2030 plans.
Brazil’s October 1988 constitution included provi-
sions that development projects affecting indigenous 
peoples required approval by both houses of the Na-
tional Congress (Article 231, Paragraph 3) and that 
“Removal of indigenous groups from their lands is 
prohibited, except (….) in cases of catastrophe or epi-
demic that put the population at risk, or in the inter-
est of the sovereignty of the country (….), [but,] in any 
event, an immediate return is guaranteed as soon as 
the risk ceases” (Article 231, Paragraph 5). This did 
not result in any immediate change of plans for the 
Xingu dams, including both the plan at the time for 
Kararaô (now Belo Monte) that would have directly 
flooded indigenous land and the upstream dams that 
would flood much larger indigenous areas. In prac-
tice, there is a two-step process, where behavior re-
mains unchanged while actors wait to see what new 
requirements will actually be enforced. This is a long 
tradition in Brazil dating from colonial times (Rosenn 
1971). 
The year 1989 saw the creation of the Brazilian In-
stitute for the Environment and Renewable Natural 
Resources (Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e 
dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis = IBAMA), giving 
more institutional capacity for the licensing process, 
including vetting the Environmental Impact Study 
(Estudo de Impacto Ambiental = EIA) that had been a 
requirement for projects like dams since 1986. How-
ever, proponents of Amazonian development projects 
were still testing the limits as to how little they could 
get away with considering in these reports, and some 
major development projects were even going forward 
without the required EIA (Fearnside 1989a).
The year 1989 also saw the release of the Portu-
guese-language version of a book edited by Cultural 
Survival and the Pro-Indian Commission of São Pau-
lo showing the disastrous impacts that the Xingu 
dams would have on indigenous peoples (Santos and 
de Andrade 1990). In February of the same year the 
“Altamira demonstration” (officially the “First En-
counter of the Indigenous Peoples of the Xingu”) was 
held, led by the Kaiapó, with significant national and 
international press coverage. The event was marked 
by Tuíra, a Kaiapó woman, brandishing a machete in 
the face of the head of the government electrical com-
pany Electrical Centers of Northern Brazil (Centrais 
Elétricas do Norte do Brasil = ELETRONORTE) while 
shouting the war cry “Tenotã-mõ!” (Sevá-Filho and 
Switkes 2005). Following the Altamira demonstra-
tion, ELETRONORTE changed the name of “Kararaô” 
to “Belo Monte” and made an announcement that 
was interpreted by many as cancelling the plans for 
the upstream dams. In reality, this was not the case: 
ELETRONORTE was only promising to remove these 
dams from the 2010 Plan and to conduct a “resurvey 
of the fall” of the Xingu River, meaning that additional 
studies would modify the plans to place dams in dif-
ferent locations along the river, which does not imply 
that the same indigenous lands would not be flooded. 
The notion that the upstream dams had been defini-
tively cancelled was widespread. As late as 1994 one 
of the Kaiapó leaders gave a speech at a conference 
claiming a conclusive victory over these dams (per-
sonal observation). However, as the Kaiapó are now 
well aware, this was not (and is still not) the case. Nev-
ertheless, the impact of the Altamira demonstration 
may have served as inspiration for non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and development victims else-
where (both in Brazil and abroad) to take action in 
opposing major construction projects that otherwise 
would have been considered unstoppable.
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One of the effects of the Altamira demonstration is 
believed to have been its influence on international 
lenders. The World Bank had been expected to fund 
Belo Monte, either directly or indirectly as part of 
a sector loan (Chernela 1988). However, the World 
Bank pulled out while the first (2002) EIA was under 
preparation, and the lack of international finance is 
believed to have motivated the Brazilian government 
to place Belo Monte on hold (Hochstetler 2011: 358). 
The loss of the World Bank as a focus of the anti-dam 
campaign changed the political context, diminishing 
the campaign’s leverage in pressuring the Brazilian 
government (e.g. Carvalho 2006: 260). This change 
eliminated the “boomerang” strategy, where a local 
group in a place like Amazonia has its greatest effect 
on the national government by inducing changes in 
projects and policies of international institutions like 
the World Bank, which, in turn, have a strong influ-
ence on the national government’s actions (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998). 
A windfall for dam proponents was provided by Bra-
zil’s 2001 “Apagão,” a major energy crisis with uncon-
trolled blackouts in almost all of Brazil followed by a 
series of controlled blackouts and electricity ration-
ing measures. The crisis was mainly caused by mis-
management (Rosa 2001). Public discontent made it 
easy to argue that Amazonian dams were needed to 
save the country from future blackouts. The same op-
portunity was presented by the 2014-2015 São Paulo 
drought. As a result of the 2001 Apagão, the National 
Council on Energy Policy (Conselho Nacional de Políti-
ca Energética = CNPE) was created. This body is most-
ly composed of ministers in the federal government. 
Representatives of civil society and of the scientific 
community were supposed to be included, but these 
members have never been appointed. The CNPE would 
later play a key role in facilitating Belo Monte by fore-
stalling any criticism of the upstream dam plans.
In March 2002, a new plan for the design of the Belo 
Monte reservoir was announced in order to avoid 
flooding any indigenous land. Throughout the almost 
14 years that had elapsed since the 1988 constitution 
had created a barrier to flooding indigenous land, the 
companies had been investing in a design that called 
for indigenous lands to be flooded. This illustrates 
the impunity that the dam proponents were expect-
ing and the gradual process of adjustment. The dam 
was moved upstream from its former position, thus 
decreasing the area and volume of the reservoir. The 
design was also changed to divert most of the river’s 
flow through canals to a powerhouse below the Big 
Bend of the Xingu, rather than following the normal 
pattern of generating all power at the foot of the dam 
itself. This new design significantly increased the ver-
tical drop that could be used for power generation, but 
it would leave the Big Bend with greatly reduced flow, 
thus creating a different kind of impact on the indig-
enous people downstream of the new dam location. 
The EIA that was prepared in 2002 (Brazil, 
ELETRONORTE nd [2002]) was never formally sub-
mitted to IBAMA. Legal decisions in 2001 and 2002, 
which accepted some of the arguments in a Civil Pub-
lic Suit (Ação Civil Pública = ACP) brought by the Fed-
eral Public Ministry (MPF), resulted in suspension 
of the licensing process (Sevá Filho 2014). Upstream 
dams were entirely omitted from this first EIA, al-
though the viability study for the one-dam plan ex-
plains that considering only Belo Monte is the result of 
political considerations, and that Belo Monte’s output 
would be much greater with upstream dams (Brazil, 
ELETRONORTE 2002: 6-82). Despite this disclaimer, 
studies for the upstream dams were continuing. The 
second EIA (Brazil, ELETROBRÁS 2009) would also 
omit consideration of upstream dams.
The 1988 constitutional requirement that the Nation-
al Congress approve any projects with impacts on in-
digenous peoples was seen as an almost unsurmount-
able barrier to proposing dams that would flood 
indigenous lands. This was the reason for the 2002 
revision of the Belo Monte design to avoid flooding 
indigenous land. Then everything changed in 2005, 
when the National Congress approved Belo Monte 
in record time under a special “urgent” regime that 
limits debate. Former president José Sarney was the 
person in charge of modifications to the bill (the “rela-
tor”) in the Senate, facilitating Senate approval only 
three days after the House of Deputies approved the 
measure, producing Legislative Decree No. 788 of 13 
July 2005 (Calheiros 2005). This decree, authorizing 
initiation of the Belo Monte licensing process, was ap-
proved by both houses in only 15 days, providing a re-
vealing contrast with the 17 years that the indigenous 
people had been waiting for the National Congress 
to enact laws for their protection as specified in the 
1988 constitution (Graeff 2012: 273). The indigenous 
peoples were not consulted prior to approval of the 
measure by the National Congress, as required by the 
constitution. This legislative event sent a signal for 
the subsequent surge in Amazonian dam proposals 
(see Fearnside 2012). 
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On 31 October 2007, ELETROBRÁS released a Power-
point presentation (Brazil, ELETROBRÁS 2007a) of a 
new inventory of the Xingu River (although not the in-
ventory itself: Brazil, ELETROBRÁS 2007b). Three al-
ternatives were considered, two with four dams (but 
with differing water levels in the three that would be 
upstream of Belo Monte) and the third alternative 
with only Belo Monte. The inventory and presenta-
tion assert that the third alternative, with only Belo 
Monte, was selected. The inventory indicates that the 
upstream dams would be financially attractive based 
on the unitary reference cost of dams to be built in 
the ELETROBRÁS ten-year plan at the time, but that 
weighting by factors for environmental impact made 
the one-dam choice more attractive overall (Brazil, 
ELETROBRÁS 2007b, Vol. 1, Tome 2: 5-115). The two 
alternatives with upstream dams would flood, in ad-
dition to Belo Monte, 2283 and 3004 km2, respective-
ly, including Altamira/Babaquara. The 2007 invento-
ry calls for fewer dams and about one-sixth the total 
area to be flooded, as compared to the inventory in 
the 1980s that is represented by the 2010 Plan (Bra-
zil, ELETROBRÁS 1987). However, substantial areas of 
indigenous land would still be flooded. The assump-
tion that the option announced as “selected” (i.e., 
only Belo Monte) is what would take place in practice 
is central to the entire discussion and struggle sur-
rounding Belo Monte. Subsequent developments up-
stream could follow the two other alternatives given 
in the 2007 inventory, or they could (as has occurred 
elsewhere) evolve with water levels being raised (and 
flooded areas consequently being expanded) beyond 
what is initially announced. 
One of the indications suggesting that an option with 
upstream dams might be the real one is that the 
11,000-MW installed capacity of the main powerhouse 
at Belo Monte remains unchanged in the scenarios 
with and without upstream dams. The electrical au-
thorities had earlier floated plans for Belo Monte with 
the total capacity reduced to 5500, 5900 or 7500 MW 
(Pinto 2003), which would have been more consistent 
with an unregulated flow of the Xingu River.
The one-dam plan became the official scenario on 3 
July 2008 when the National Council on Energy Policy 
(CNPE) issued its Resolution No. 6, stating that Belo 
Monte would be the only dam on the Xingu River. The 
claim that only one dam would be built on the Xingu 
River is what is known as the “institutionalized lie” 
by dam opponents (Nader 2008; Salm 2009a). Noth-
ing prevents the CNPE from changing its mind at 
some future date and allowing the construction of 
upstream dams. The logic of this change is apparent 
from data on the flow of the Xingu River: the average 
flows in the months of August, September, October, 
minus the amounts that the consortium is required to 
pass through the Big Bend in these months according 
to the “hydrogram of consensus” to which it agreed, 
mean that the amount of water that can bypass the 
Big Bend through the adduction canal in these months 
is insufficient for even a single turbine in the main 
powerhouse (Table 1). In a fourth month (November) 
only one turbine would have adequate water, and the 
full 20 turbines would only be used at the peak of the 
flood season. Turbines can function at partial capac-
ity, but with reduced output.
Monthly mean flow (m³/s)
Total – Xingu River
Big Bend 
(“hydrogram of 
consensus”)
Available for the 
main power house 
Consumption of 
each turbine
August
1,557
900
657
695
September
1,066
750
316
695
October
1,115
700
415
695
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Source
(a) Brazil, ELETROBRÁS 2009: Vol. 1: 59.
(b) Norte Energia SA 2014: 6.
(c) Difference between total Xingu River flow and 
     Big Bend flow.
(d) Brazil, ELETROBRÁS 2009: Vol. 1: 48.
Table 1 Xingu River flow at Belo Monte in critical months
The economic unviability of Belo Monte without up-
stream dams to store water for use during the dry sea-
son has been interpreted as implying that there will 
be a “planned crisis” after Belo Monte is complete and 
it is suddenly discovered that the water flow is insuf-
ficient (de Sousa Júnior and Reid 2010; de Sousa Júnior 
et al. 2006). Lúcio Flávio Pinto (2002: 25, 69) dubs Belo 
Monte a “Trojan horse of concrete” and points out that 
“On the Tocantins, for example, ELETRONORTE was 
able to sell its controversial project for the Tucuruí 
Dam to public opinion based on the assumption that it 
would be the only dam on the Tocantins River in Pará” 
(an obvious falsehood, given that plans called for all of 
the river above Tucuruí being converted into a contin-
uous chain of reservoirs; see Junk and de Mello 1990). 
A strong indication that public opinion is being pre-
pared for the Altamira/Babaquara Dam was provided 
by a speech by President Dilma Vana Rousseff (known 
simply as “Dilma”) in June 2013 asserting a need for 
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dams with “large reservoirs” rather than continuing 
to build run-of-river dams like Belo Monte (Borges 
2013). 
In September 2009 a public hearing (audiência públi-
ca) was held in Altamira, as required for discussion 
of the second EIA (i.e., Brazil, ELETROBRÁS 2009). The 
hearing was held to discuss the EIA only two days af-
ter this massive document had been released to the 
public, contributing to the hearing’s lack of verisimili-
tude as an informed debate (Salm 2009b). These hear-
ings have limited real public participation, partly be-
cause they are held in venues with inadequate space 
to accommodate many of the affected people and be-
cause the first several hours of the hearings are occu-
pied by engineers from the dam consortium making 
long technical presentations, while statements from 
the public are only allowed at the end, usually in the 
dead of night. The hearings were also accompanied by 
an overpowering police and military presence. Indig-
enous participants were present at the beginning of 
the session, but then left so as not to allow their pres-
ence to be interpreted as agreeing with the dams, and 
especially as having been “consulted.” 
In 2009 a representative of the National Indian Foun-
dation (Fundação Nacional do Índio = FUNAI) made 
presentations in indigenous villages in which he ex-
plicitly stated that the gatherings were not “oitivas” 
(consultations as required by International Labor 
Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and by Brazilian 
Constitution Article 231), as shown in a video of the 
presentation in one of the villages made by the indig-
enous participants (Medialivre 2011). On 14 October 
2009 FUNAI submitted a formal opinion (parecer) 
to IBAMA on the indigenous component of licensing 
Belo Monte (Brazil, FUNAI 2009). The opinion states 
(p. 14) that FUNAI would be willing to “accompany … 
new consultations [novas oitivas],” implying that the 
presentations they had made in the villages were, in 
fact, consultations. The coverletter from the head of 
FUNAI states that the agency considers the dam to be 
“viable” so long as a list of conditions is met, and states 
explicitly that “With regard to the carrying out of con-
sultations with indigenous peoples [oitivas indígenas], 
this Foundation considers that it has fulfilled [its du-
ties under] Legislative decree 788/05, in the course of 
the licensing process” (Guapindaia 2009). When indig-
enous people invaded the FUNAI office in Altamira in 
2010 they discovered a collection of DVDs recording 
the 2009 presentations in the villages, labeled as “oi-
tivas indígenas” (Xingu Vivo 2011a). In February 2011 
FUNAI released a public note also claimed that these 
presentations represented a “consultation” and that 
FUNAI had thereby fulfilled its duties in the licensing 
process (Xingu Vivo 2011a). The deception these inci-
dents revealed has been a particularly sensitive issue 
in increasing distrust of FUNAI and other government 
agencies.
Indigenous people are aware that they need to take 
care not to have their participation in meetings in-
terpreted as a “consultation.” Required consultations 
with indigenous peoples represent one of the only 
tools these people have to prevent a project from go-
ing forward. Their option is not to participate in the 
consultation, as this would only result in the box be-
ing checked off that the consultation had been con-
ducted, thereby allowing the project to move forward. 
Refusal to participate is their only real option. Obvi-
ously, deep reform of the system is needed for this re-
ality to change.
“Consultation,” as the term is used in ILO Convention 
169, implies a voice in the decision on whether to build 
or not to build the infrastructure in question (that is, 
not just to modify the compensation or mitigation 
measures), and the consulted population must have, 
at the least, a “realistic” chance of affecting the deci-
sion that is made (ILO 2005). Some interpretations go 
further, holding that the consulted population has a 
clear right to say “no” (Esteves et al. 2012). By contrast, 
the public hearings (audiências públicas) required in 
the licensing process for all major projects, whether 
or not they affect indigenous peoples, provides a plat-
form for affected people to voice their concerns, but 
their influence is limited to suggestions for adjust-
ments in mitigation programs rather than question-
ing the existence of the project as a whole.
Formation of the Belo Monte “Panel of Specialists” 
in 2009 was a step that provided alternative infor-
mation in the discussion of the EIA. This group of 40 
academics (of which this author was one) was brought 
together to read the approximately 20,000 pages of 
the 2009 EIA and prepare commentary in record time 
in order to have input to the approval deliberations 
within the timetables required in the licensing pro-
cess. The report (Magalhães and Hernández 2009) was 
delivered to IBAMA in September 2009. The dam pro-
ponents went to considerable lengths in attempts to 
disqualify the report and some of its authors (Hernán-
dez and Santos 2011). However, when the IBAMA 
technical staff issued their 345-page formal opinion 
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(parecer) on 23 November 2009 (Brazil, IBAMA 2009) 
recommending against approval of a Preliminary Li-
cense for Belo Monte without an extensive revision of 
the EIA, some of the information they used to substan-
tiate their conclusion was derived from the Panel of 
Specialists report.
The year 2009 ended with a setback for the anti-dam 
struggle in the loss of Glenn Switkes to cancer on 21 
December (McCully 2009). He headed the Brazilian 
branch of International Rivers and was tireless oppo-
nent of Belo Monte; his ashes were committed to the 
waters of the Big Bend of the Xingu River. Another im-
portant opponent of the dam would later succumb to 
the same disease: Arsenio Oswaldo Sevá Filho of the 
State University of Campinas (UNICAMP) on 28 Feb-
ruary 2015.
On 26 January 2010 the IBAMA technical staff issued 
another technical opinion (Brazil, IBAMA 2010) op-
posing approval of a preliminary license. Neverthe-
less, the full preliminary license (No. 342/2010) was 
issued on 1 February 2010 with 40 preconditions that 
were supposed to be met before an installation license 
would be granted to actually build the dam. The direc-
tor of IBAMA’s licensing sector was replaced before 
the preliminary license was granted (Agência Brasil 
2011).
In April 2010, bidding to own and operate Belo Mon-
te was won by Norte Energia, Sociedade Anônima, 
or NESA (http://norteenergiasa.com.br/site/). This 
group was made up of 10 companies, mostly govern-
ment entities. The close ties between NESA and the 
government are illustrated by the head of the ad-
ministrative council of NESA being a former head of 
ELETROBRÁS, and by many of the companies included 
in NESA now being investigated by the Lava-Jato cor-
ruption probe (Sassine and de Souza 2016). 
Media attacks on dam opponents escalated as the li-
censing process progressed in 2010 (e.g. Leite 2010; see replies: Medeiros 2010; Fearnside 2010). ELETRO-
BRÁS and NESA increased their advertising of Belo 
Monte in print media and television, and ELETROBRÁS 
mounted an advertising campaign in all of Brazil’s 
major airports. In his June 2010 speech in Altamira, 
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (known simply as 
“Lula”) called those who question Belo Monte “a half-
dozen well-intentioned young people who, if they had 
the patience to listen, would learn what I have already 
learned…” (International Rivers 2010: 1). This pater-
nalistic tone has been identified as a “strategically 
crafted” turning point in the government discourse 
on Belo Monte by minimizing the opponents as naïve 
and uninformed (Bratman 2014: 274; 2015: 72). The 
discourse had long been aggressive: in 2006 President 
Lula listed indigenous peoples and environmentalists 
as “obstacles” (“entraves”) to growth (Glass 2006: 1), 
and in 2009 Brazil’s minister of mines and energy 
declared that Belo Monte was being impeded by “de-
monic forces” (“ forças demoníacas”) (Lima 2009: 1). 
A key tactic of the pro-dam side has always been to 
portray the dam as inevitable, and, therefore, at-
tempts to change the decision to build it as completely 
delusionary. As the licensing process progressed this 
argument naturally gained ever more force. The per-
ception of opposing Belo Monte as a “losing battle” 
was an important factor in various local opponents, 
including indigenous groups, dropping opposition to 
the dam in favor of pressing for more generous mitiga-
tion programs (Bratman 2015: 74). Creating a percep-
tion that a dam project is inevitable was effectively 
used by proponents in Belo Monte just as this strategy 
has been used by the government in previous Ama-
zonian struggles, such as that surrounding the “ir-
reversible” Balbina Dam (Fearnside 1989b). However, 
the outcome is never foreordained.
NESA contracted a consortium of ten construction 
companies to build the dam: the Consórcio Construtor 
Belo Monte (CCBM) (https://www.consorciobelomon-
te.com.br/). The arrival of this consortium in Altami-
ra at the beginning of 2011 was a key factor in local 
perceptions regarding the inevitability of the dam.
Dilma became president of Brazil on 1 January 2011. 
On 12 January, the head of IBAMA resigned rather 
than sign an installation license for the Belo Monte 
construction site (Hurwitz 2011). On 26 January 
2011, the new head of IBAMA issued an installation 
license for the construction site and for access roads 
and other infrastructure, but excepting the dam itself 
(No. 770/211). Partial licenses do not exist in Brazil-
ian legislation. Issuing the license was summarized 
succinctly by the Federal Public Ministry (Ministério 
Público Federal – MPF, a public prosecutor’s office for 
defending the interests of the people) in Belém as “to-
tally illegal” (Miotto 2011). 
In January 2011, Avaaz (2011) launched an internet 
petition against Belo Monte that received 760,000 sig-
natures internationally and in Brazil. Another cam-
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paign in December 2011 received 68,000 signatures, 
while subsequent campaigns in 2012 received 47,000 
and 34,000 signatures, respectively. There were also 
telephone and e-mail campaigns, as well as street 
demonstrations.
In March 2011 President Dilma was enraged by the 
finding by the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (IACHR) of the Organization of American States 
(OAS) that the downstream indigenous groups were 
indeed directly impacted by Belo Monte and were en-
titled to free, prior and informed consent thorough a 
consultation (Folha de São Paulo 2011; Siciliano 2011). 
She ordered the withdrawal of Brazil’s ambassador 
from the OAS and suspended Brazil’s payments of 
dues to the organization, creating a diplomatic crisis. 
In 2012 the ILO would also find that Convention 169, 
which had been signed and ratified by Brazil, required 
consulting the downstream groups ( Justiça Global 
Brasil 2012; see also Puentes and Vieira 2015).
As the Belo Monte licensing process progressed to-
wards a full installation license, international groups 
made renewed appeals to President Dilma (Ama-
zon Watch and International Rivers 2011). A petition 
signed by 500,000 people was delivered to authorities 
in February 2011 (Hance 2011) and a Brazilian peti-
tion with 1.3 million signatures from the “Drop of Wa-
ter” (Gota d’Água) initiative by television soap-opera 
stars was delivered in December 2011 (Rapoza 2011).
The IBAMA technical staff opposed issuing the in-
stallation license for the dam itself on the grounds 
that most of the conditions had not been met (Brazil, 
IBAMA 2011). Nevertheless, the license was granted 
by IBAMA on 1 June 2011 (No. 795/2011) with only 
5 of the 40 preconditions having been met according 
to the NGOs and 16 according to IBAMA. Note that 
granting preliminary licenses with preconditions rep-
resents a relatively recent practice, having begun only 
in 2003 – that is, coincident with the beginning of the 
Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores = PT) presi- 
dential administration under Lula and Dilma – and 
the use of this expedient to speed license approval has 
steadily increased ever since (Bratman 2015: 69). The 
precedent of granting an installation license without 
fulfilling all preconditions was a legacy of licensing 
the Madeira River dams in 2008, an event that raises 
the question of what value a precondition has if licenses 
can be obtained without fulfilling them (Fearnside 
2014a).
The head (“president”) of IBAMA had supported the 
technical staff in insisting on fulfilling the precon-
ditions prior to approving an installation license 
for Belo Monte. He was removed and replaced by an 
IBAMA employee who was on the verge of retirement, 
and who promptly signed the license (No. 795/2011). 
Soon afterwards, he gave an interview to Australian 
television in which he invoked the history of Australia’s 
aborigines as an apology for contemporary killing of 
Amazonian indigenous people (Xingu Vivo 2011b).
Construction of Belo Monte began on 23 June 2011. 
Some local academics opposing the dam fell silent af-
ter construction started in 2011, given the significant 
potential personal cost of continuing to speak out. Lo-
cal opponents continued to be harassed as construc-
tion progressed.
In June 2012 the main Belo Monte construction site 
was invaded by various indigenous groups, with par-
ticularly active participation of a group of about 20 
Munduruku warriors who had come from the Tapajós 
River, where their land is threatened by planned dams 
(see Bratman 2015: 74). The Munduruku vandalized 
the company offices at the construction site of the 
main dam (“Sitio Pimental”), but the Xingu indigenous 
groups and the non-indigenous individuals and or-
ganizations that were present did not participate (I 
have been told this by both indigenous and non-indig-
enous participants). Nevertheless, 11 non-indigenous 
activists were charged with crimes (Bratman 2015: 
74). On the strength of this incident, in March 2013 
the consortium obtained a legal order from a Pará 
state magistrate in Altamira that would automati-
cally fine two non-indigenous NGOs each R$50,000 
(~US$25,000) per day if any other invasions occurred 
(MAB 2013). The organizations were the Xingu Alive 
Forever Movement (Movimento Xingu Vivo para Sem-
pre = Xingu Vivo) and the Movement of Dam-Affect-
ed People (Movimento dos Atingidos por Barragens = 
MAB). Indigenous people invaded the construction 
site of the main powerhouse (“Sitio Belo Monte”) in 
June 2013, after which the site was physically forti-
fied with formidable walls and fencing (Agência Públi-
ca 2014). Construction continued through 2014 and 
2015, with the exception of brief interruptions from 
disturbances, strikes and court orders.
Harassment of local opponents continued. In February 
2013 an employee of the dam consortium infiltrated a 
meeting of Xingu Vivo and was caught recording the 
proceedings with an apparatus disguised as a large 
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ballpoint pen. When confronted by the others at the 
meeting, his confession was filmed and posted online 
(Xingu Vivo 2013).
On 10 September 2015 the IBAMA technical staff is-
sued a 242-page formal opinion listing a series of con-
ditions that were still pending that the proponents 
would have to fulfill before an operating license could 
be granted (Brazil, IBAMA 2015). Nevertheless, on 24 
November 2015 IBAMA issued the operating license 
despite most of the conditions not having been met 
(see Villas-Bôas et al. 2015). Filling the reservoir be-
gan on 12 December 2015. On 21 December 2015 the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IA-
CHR) opened case against Brazil for human rights vi-
olations related to the Belo Monte Dam (AIDA 2016).
3.  Lessons
The Belo Monte struggle brought together an impres-
sive coalition of actors in questioning and resisting 
the dam project. Noticeably more domestic and inter-
national attention was focused on this case than, for 
example, the dams on the Madeira and Tapajós Rivers. 
The Panel of Specialists, repeated major demonstra-
tions, over 60 legal suits and many other events and 
campaigns surpass what has been seen elsewhere. Yet 
in the end, these efforts and the facts they revealed 
about the unviability and illegality of the project and 
the magnitude of its impacts did not impede the jug-
gernaut from reaching its planned goal in the form of 
the dam that blocks the Xingu River today.
The struggle at the local level is necessarily the key to 
events at all other levels. This struggle, carried out by 
local indigenous and non-indigenous groups, has been 
the focus of a long series of studies applying sociologi-
cal methods to analyzing their discourse and use of 
the media (e.g. Andrade 2015; Bingham 2010; Castro 2012; da Silva 2011; Fleury and Almeida 2013; Guzmán 
nd [C. 2011]; Jouberte and de Mello 2014; MacLeod nd 
[C. 2014]; McCormick 2006, 2007, 2011). However, 
what really distinguishes these local groups is that 
they do not just represent or support the victims of 
Belo Monte – they are the victims. They are neces-
sarily focused on the impacts of this particular dam, 
rather than migrating from one issue to the next as 
can sometimes happen with environmental and hu-
man-rights groups located in distant urban centers. 
When the activists themselves have their homes and 
livelihoods under immediate threat there is less rel-
evance to discussions of the theoretical or philosophi-
cal underpinnings of their actions or to the very real 
connections of local events to such general concerns 
as social justice, environmental sustainability and a 
democratic political system functioning under a state 
of law. 
Xingu Vivo in particular has, in addition to its own 
grassroots membership, been able to enlist the sup-
port and collaboration of a wide range of other actors, 
such as national and international NGOs, academics, 
journalists and celebrities. The various supporting 
groups and individuals should have a measure of hu-
mility with respect to their overall importance in the 
struggle at Belo Monte and in other resource conflicts. 
While outside groups tend to move on to the next cri-
sis now that the Belo Monte Dam has actually been 
built and filled, it should be remembered that Belo 
Monte is only the beginning of the “Altamira Complex” 
and the damming of the rest of the Xingu River. Both 
local and distant groups are sure to have important 
roles as these developments play out.
While the struggle at the local level is naturally fo-
cused on the dam proposed at the place in question, 
the struggle at more distant venues also tends to fo-
cus on the urgent demands of the environmental and 
human-rights crisis represented by each dam project. 
The visibility and concreteness of these projects is es-
sential to understanding what they imply. However, it 
is not enough to fight each dam: the question must be 
addressed as to whether Brazil needs a massive dam-
building program in Amazonia. The answer to this is 
no (e.g. Baitelo et al. 2013; Moreira 2012). 
Along with reforming how electricity is produced and 
used, institutional changes are needed in how deci-
sions are made on dam projects. The environmental 
studies, public hearings and consultations with tra-
ditional peoples need to take place before the initial 
decision on dam construction is made. Today these 
decisions are made behind closed doors by a handful 
of technocrats and political appointees, long before 
any information on the environmental and social im-
pacts of the project have been gathered let alone pub-
lically debated. What is needed is a reform of decision-
making, not just a reform of licensing (Fearnside 2007, 
2014a,b, 2015a,b; Fearnside and Graça 2006). 
Another essential battlefield is to repeal security sus-
pension laws in Brazil (Fearnside 2015a). These laws 
allow any judicial decision to be reversed if it would 
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cause “grave damage” to the public economy. Since 
any hydroelectric dam is important for the economy, 
security suspensions can be invoked to override any 
decision based on violation of environmental regula-
tions and protections of human rights (e.g. Prudente 
2013, 2014). Security suspensions were created dur-
ing Brazil’s 1964-1985 military dictatorship (Law 
4348 of 26 June 1964) but are still in force today (laws 
8437 of 30 June 1992 and 12,016 of 7 August 2009). 
By 2014 they had been used at eight times in the case 
of Belo Monte and 12 times in the case of the Tapajós 
Dams (Palmquist 2014; see also Garzón et al. 2015).
Important as academic studies are as providers of in-
formation in struggles such as this, one is reminded 
of Gandhi’s statement that the freedom of India would 
not be won by a few lawyers in Bombay (Fischer 1964 
[2010]). It is a country’s people who bring about 
change. In the case of improving decision making on 
Amazonian dams, any change requires that the im-
pacts of dams and the deficiencies of the system that 
leads to them be understood beyond the rural people 
in the Amazonian interior who are the main victims of 
these dams. In Brazil 85% of the population is urban.
The Belo Monte case has similarities with dam contro-
versies elsewhere in Brazilian Amazonia. At Belo Mon-
te, the proponents succeeded in keeping the “institu-
tionalized lie” concerning plans for upstream dams 
out of the discussion inside Brazil. It is virtually com-
pletely absent from the Brazilian mainstream press. 
The 2008 resolution by CNPE was useful in further 
deflecting attention from impacts of upstream dams 
and insuring that these would not delay approval of 
the licenses for Belo Monte itself. Similar scenarios 
are playing out in other cases. While licensing process 
for the Madeira River Dams was underway, this au-
thor asked the head engineer of Odebrecht (the main 
construction firm planning to build the dams) in Por-
to Velho about plans for the Guajará Mirim Dam (also 
known as “Cachoeira Riberão”), planned for construc-
tion upstream of the two dams that have now been 
built – Santo Antônio and Jirau (PCE et al. 2004). The 
reply was that discussing the upstream dam was for-
bidden until after the first two dams were approved. 
The third dam would be necessary for a major water-
way (hidrovia) for transporting soybeans (Fearnside 
2014a). Construction of the third dam is now under 
negotiation with Bolivia, which shares this stretch of 
the Madeira River. 
A similar case is the planned Chacorão Dam on the Ta-
pajós River (see Fearnside 2015a, b). This dam would 
flood 11,700 ha of the Munduruku Indigenous Land 
(see Fearnside 2015a). It appears in various plans (e.g. 
Brazil, PR 2015; CNEC Worley Parsons Engenharia S.A. 
2014a), but is not mentioned in the EIA for the first 
Tapajós Dam (CNEC Worley Parsons Engenharia S.A. 
2014b) nor in the ELETROBRÁS ten-year plans (e.g. 
Brazil, MME/EPE 2015: 393). However, it would be 
needed to make the river navigable for the Tapajós 
Waterway (Brazil, MT 2010), which is a top priority 
in the “transportation axis” of the PAC. The parallel 
with Babaquara (Altamira) and other planned dams 
upstream of Belo Monte is clear: omitting discussion 
of associated dams with major impacts facilitates ap-
proval of the first dams on a river, and, when the time 
comes, the approval of the subsequent dams can be 
expected to be facilitated by the existence of the dams 
that have already been built. In the case of Babaquara 
(Altamira), when this was openly included in the plans 
it was to come on line seven years after completion of 
Belo Monte (Brazil, ELETROBRÁS 1998: 145).
Now that Belo Monte exists as a physical reality on 
the Xingu River, it is important to remember that the 
struggle there is far from over. Holding the dam con-
sortium to account for the many unfulfilled promises 
for resettlement and for a wide variety of measures to 
mitigate the dam’s environmental and social impacts 
is a major effort on which very little progress has been 
made (ISA 2014; Villas-Bôas et al. 2015). Of course, 
the likely unveiling of plans for disastrous upstream 
dams is an ever-present factor now that Belo Monte is 
physically present. 
Lessons of history are evident for the case of the up-
stream Xingu River dams. Building of dams in series 
to regulate streamflow and increase the output of 
downstream dams is well known in hydropower de-
velopment worldwide; it is illustrated by the dam-
ming of Brazil’s Tocantins River beginning with the 
Tucuruí Dam, with parallels to the upstream Xingu 
dams that were evident from Tucuruí’s inception 
(Fearnside 1999). This author has long contested the 
Belo Monte proponents’ portrayal of the dam’s ben-
efits without considering the impacts of the planned 
upstream dams (Fearnside 1996). Denying these plans 
fits into a pattern shown by past the history of Brazil’s 
Amazonian dams.
One parallel is the filling of the Balbina Dam (Fearn-
side 1989b), where an official statement released 
just two weeks before the dam was closed promised 
Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam: Lessons of an Amazonian resource struggle
178 DIE ERDE · Vol. 148 · 2-3/2017
to fill it only to a level 46 m above sea level (Brazil, 
ELETRONORTE 1987a), but instead it was filled direct-
ly to a level 50 m above sea level – a plan that was, 
in fact, in place the entire time as shown by docu-
ments obtained while the reservoir was filling (Brazil, 
ELETRONORTE 1987b). The second case is the Tucu-
ruí-II project, which was built without an EIA on the 
basis of a promise not to raise the water level in the 
reservoir beyond the 70 m-above-sea-level mark in 
the Turucuí-I project (Indriunas 1998), but instead the 
level was quietly raised to 74 m, as originally planned, 
when the water was needed to run the Tucuruí-II tur-
bines (see Fearnside 2006). There is no reason to be-
lieve that these were isolated incidents by rogue em-
ployees – instead they are best explained as part of 
an institutional culture that systematically employs 
“disinformation.” Both the indigenous people whose 
land would be flooded by dams on the Xingu River 
upstream of Belo Monte and those whose land would 
be flooded by the Chacorão Dam on the Tapajós River 
are well aware of how history is likely to play out as a 
result of the initial downstream dams (Belo Monte on 
the Xingu River and São Luiz do Tapajós and Jatobá on 
the Tapajós River), despite official silence on plans for 
upstream dams. Never has the century-old observa-
tion of George Santayana been more relevant “Those 
who cannot remember the past are doomed to repeat 
it” (Santayana 1905: 95).
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